CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN CHAPTER 11:
THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
DIRECTORS AND STOCKHOLDERS OF
SOLVENT AND INSOLVENT
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Harvey R. Miller *
INTRODUCTION

In 1992 the corporate world witnessed a wave of management upheavals in some of the largest commercial corporations
in the United States. As a result of increasing and direct stockholder criticism, public directors are becoming more sensitive to
their obligations to the corporation and its stockholders. Dormant management-controlled directors are passing into history
as nonmanagement directors have become more objective and
comprehensive in evaluating management in an effort to improve
corporate performance. This surge of pro-active conduct illustrates an increasing recognition of the fiduciary duties that are
imposed upon a corporation's directors.
The applicable principle of law is well-settled. Directors owe
certain fiduciary duties, generally the duties of care and loyalty,
to the stockholders of a solvent corporation. Basically, the duty
of care requires directors to exercise that degree of care that an
ordinarily prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances, while the duty of loyalty prohibits self-dealing
and the usurpation of corporate opportunities. Upon the occurrence of insolvency, however, the scope of these fiduciary duties
expands to include obligations to the corporation's creditors.
The precise nature of the fiduciary duties of directors of an
insolvent corporation to the corporation's creditors and stockholders becomes somewhat vague and diaphanous postinsolvency and after the commencement of a bankruptcy case
under chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the
"Bankruptcy Code").' Generally, the management of the debtor
* Partner, Weil, Gotshal & Manges, New York, New York; Contributing Editor,
Collieron Bankruptcy (15th ed. 1993). The author is deeply appreciative of the assistance of his associate Michele J. Meises in the preparation of this Article.
I Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. 1992)).
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continues to operate the business and manage the assets of the
corporation as a debtor in possession ("DIP"). The DIP acts qua
trustee under the Bankruptcy Code and is responsible for the
preservation and administration of the debtor's estate. Nevertheless, the DIP is the same entity as the debtor and there is no
change in the normal rules of corporate governance. The board
of directors remains the policymaker and appoints the corporate
officers subject to the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The
directors of the debtor as DIP continue to owe the twin fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty to both the creditors and stockholders
of the debtor corporation. However, these beneficiaries often
have conflicting interests as to the administration of a bankruptcy
case, the development of a plan of reorganization, or any alternative. These conflicts become even more aggravated when the
corporation is insolvent.
This Article will explore the obligation or appropriateness of
boards of directors to negotiate for some consideration for stockholders in a plan of reorganization despite the fact that the
debtor is patently insolvent. The concept that a debtor is under
an obligation to bargain on behalf of stockholders of an insolvent
corporation is implicit in the philosophy and policies underlying
the provisions of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. 2 The process of rehabilitating and reorganizing a debtor under chapter 11
should result in the enhancement of the value of the corporation.
During the pendency of a case under chapter 11, a corporation
which initially may appear to be insolvent may be rehabilitated to
the point that enhanced reorganization value extends to the
stockholders. It is the grey area between liquidation value and
going concern value which may be realized because of a chapter
11 reorganization that provides a potential interest for existing
stockholders. Participation in this realization is consistent with
the primary objective of chapter 11 - the achievement of a consensual plan of reorganization. Accordingly, within certain constraints, the directors of a debtor continue to have a fiduciary
obligation to cause the management to bargain for some participation in the reorganized entity for stockholders. This conclusion is buttressed by the power of the stockholders, generally, to
elect directors notwithstanding the debtor's insolvency.
Part I of this Article explores the scope of the fiduciary obligations of directors of corporations that are outside of bankruptcy. It begins with a discussion of the recent activism in the
2

11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988).
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world of corporate governance. It then discusses the scope of
the fiduciary obligations that directors of both solvent and insolvent corporations have to the corporation's stockholders and
other constituents.
Part II of this Article examines the fiduciary obligations that
are owed to the creditors and stockholders of corporations that
have commenced cases under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code. It analyzes the debtor's responsibility to benefit the
debtor's estate as a whole as well as the manner in which conflicts
between the duties owed to creditors and stockholders are resolved. It then compares the role of the debtor in the perspective
of solvency and insolvency. This Part rejects the view that stockholders of an insolvent debtor are no longer real parties in interest because it is contrary to the scheme and purposes integral to
the application of the reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.
Part III of this Article explores the right of stockholders to
cause a change in the board of directors of a chapter 11 debtor.
It begins with a discussion of the judicial treatment of stockholders' requests to compel a meeting to elect directors. Despite the
pendency of a reorganization case, stockholders do retain many
rights relating to corporate governance, including the right to
elect directors. Stockholders' requests to convene a meeting to
elect directors may be denied, however, if the policies of the
Bankruptcy Code would be undermined. This Part then argues
that normal corporate governance should prevail during a chapter 11 case, inclusive of the right to cause stockholders' meetings
to be held, irrespective of insolvency, unless the exercise of normal corporate governance rights would impair or destroy the
ability to achieve the objectives of chapter 11. Finally, this Part
concludes with an analysis of the right of preferred stockholders
to elect directors. Unlike common stockholders, preferred stockholders usually only may elect directors upon a prescribed default in the payment of preferred dividends. This Part argues
that the exercise by preferred stockholders of the right to elect
directors, which is triggered by monetary default and continues
only so long as the default is extant, is a violation of the automatic stay because it is an action to exercise control over property of, and to recover on a claim against, the debtor.
I.

ROLE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

The business and affairs of a corporation are managed by or
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under the control of its board of directors.3 The existence and
exercise of this power carries with it certain fundamental fiduciary duties. These duties, however, do not exist in the abstract.
Rather they must be considered in relation to specific beneficiaries. A director of a solvent corporation owes certain fiduciary
duties, namely the duties of care and loyalty, to the corporation
and its stockholders. Upon the occurrence of insolvency, however, this duty expands to benefit the corporation's creditors as
well. As stockholders have realized their prerogative to directly
challenge underperforming management, directors have become
more sensitive to their fiduciary duties. As a result, the performance of management has been subjected to greater scrutiny.
A.

Activism in Corporate Governance

This past year, "events have moved at lightening speed for
the world of corporate governance."' 4 Since early 1992, corporate America has gone through a record number of basically involuntary senior management changes initiated by growing
stockholder dissatisfaction and executed by responsive nonmanagement directors. Chief executives at General Motors, American Express, and IBM who fought in vain to keep their offices
ended up being replaced in an atmosphere of director independence fueled by stockholder pressure.
In the past, individual stockholders who were dissatisfied
with corporate performance usually did not approach boards of
directors. Rather, they would sell their stock. However, large
institutions, such as pension funds or money managers, have recently replaced individuals as the predominant owners of corporate stock.5 These institutional investors have accrued significant
power. It has been projected that by the year 2000, the twenty
largest pension funds combined with the ten largest money managers will own between 22 and 29 percent of the outstanding equity of the ten largest corporations in the United States. 6 This
3 See, e.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 701
(McKinney 1986).
4 Ira M. Millstein, Corporate Governance in the 1990's: Focus on the Board,
Distinguished Lecture in International Business & Trade Law, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, at 2 (Feb. 4, 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the Seton Hall Law Review) [hereinafter Millstein].
5 See, e.g., William Power, Small Investor Continues to Give Up Controlof Stocks, WALL
ST. J., May 11, 1992, at CI (direct stock holdings by individuals dropped from
84.1% of the market in 1965 to 53.5%o of the market in 1991).
6 See Carolyn K. Brancato, Concentration of Equity Holdings in the Top 10
Corporations by the Largest Pension Funds and Money Managers: 1985 to 1989,
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change in stock ownership has resulted in a change in the focus
of corporate performance from the stock market to the corporate
governance structure of existing corporations. 7
The new concentration of ownership in the form of institutional investors has caused a heightened corporate discipline.
The existence of organized stockholder groups has had significant impact on corporate governance. These stockholders have
increasingly demanded that directors discharge their fiduciary
obligations to them by revamping a corporation's management
when necessary in order to improve corporate performance and
increase value for stockholders. Concomitantly, boards of directors have begun to recognize that they must monitor management's performance more comprehensively and objectively in the
interests of stockholders.' In many situations, chief executive officers no longer exercise dominant influence over the actions of
directors.
Activists have been advocating the reformation of the governance structure of existing corporations by improving the function of the board of directors. Their goal is to make the board of
directors "what it is supposed to be - a real monitor, on behalf
of the shareholders, of corporate performance by corporate
managers." 9
One of the most innovative changes in corporate governance
that has been advocated involves the concept of separating leadership of the board of directors from the position of chief executive officer. This innovation recently came to fruition as a result
of the board action at General Motors Corporation ("GM"), the
world's largest corporation. On March 28, 1992, the outside directors of GM told Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive
Officer ("CEO") Robert C. Stempel that two senior executives
should bedischarged and that he should resign as chairman of
GM's executive committee.' 0 GM's institutional investors demanded that a new model of corporate governance be installed at
GM. The directors of GM were advised to split the duties of
with Projections to the Year 2000, Columbia Institutional Investor Project, Center
for Law and Economics Studies, Columbia University School of Law (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Seton Hall Law Review).
7 See Millstein, supra note 4, at 18.
8 See id. at 5 (boards of directors are responding to a culture change in boardrooms in which directors who are motivated by their reputations, pride, and selfrespect are acting because they see their responsibilities more clearly).
9 Id. at 20.
10 See Joseph B. White & Paul Ingrassia, Behind Revolt at GM, Lawyer Ira Millstein
Helped Call the Shots, WALL ST.J., Apr. 13, 1992, at Al.
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CEO and chairman of the board, and it was suggested that a nonmanagement person become chairman of the board to oversee
management." Although the CEO is in charge of running the
corporation, the CEO is accountable to the corporation's directors, who are accountable to the corporation's stockholders. In
that perspective, the natural conclusion was that separation of
board leadership from operational management is in the best interests of the corporation and its stockholders.
The activism of the GM board of directors has led to increased boards of directors initiatives at a growing number of
corporations, including Compaq Computer Co. and Sears.'" The
GM board's action has been characterized as a "'milestone that
other boards can refer to and use to take comfort in being a little
more activist in their own regard.' "'" In addition, nonmanagement directors have become increasingly aware of their obligations to the corporation's stockholders to ensure management
performance that will preserve and enhance stockholder values.14
B.

Fiduciary Duties of Directors of a Solvent Corporation Outside of
Bankruptcy
1. Directors as Fiduciaries

The directors of a corporation stand in a fiduciary relationship with the corporation and its stockholders. One who is a fiduciary occupies a special relation of trust, and is thus obligated
to protect the interests of others as carefully as, if not more carefully than, one cares for one's own interest. The concept of the
special obligations imposed upon a fiduciary was described in
'1 See Joseph B. White, CorporateLawyer Is Generalin Battle For Separation of Powers
at Top of GM, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 1992, at BI.
12 Id. at B10.
13 Allison Leigh Cowan, The High-Energy Board Room, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1992,
at D1 (quoting statement of James Kristie, the editor of Directors and Boards).
14 See generally Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Corporate Governance Reform
And Directors' Duty of Care, N.Y.L.J., May 20, 1993, at 5, which discusses whether
corporate governance reform proposals which advocate increased activism among
outside directors will result in better corporate economic performance. The authors note that "[ilncreasing the role and function of outside directors to become
more involved in management decision-making may ...have the unintended result
of effectively transforming outside directors into insiders, thus blurring the distinction between management and independent directors." Id. at 6. In addition, the
authors conclude that the "increased emphasis on the monitoring function does
not result in the imposition of new legal standards (or a novel interpretation of
existing standards) which have the effect of increasing directors' legal exposure."
Id. at 10.
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Meinhard v. Salmon 5 by Chief Judge Benjamin Cardozo as

follows:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for
those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the
morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of
behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been
the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine
the rule of undivided loyalty by the "disintegrating erosion" of
particular exceptions. Only thus has the level of conduct for
fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the
crowd. 16
This relationship of trust between directors and the corporation
and its stockholders 1 7 "springs from the fact that directors have the
control and guidance of corporate business affairs and property and
hence of the property interests of the stockholders. Equity recognizes that stockholders are the proprietors of the corporate interest
and are ultimately the only beneficiaries thereof."'" Accordingly, in
equity, a director of a corporation
owes the corporation complete loyalty, honesty, and good
faith. That duty is owed the corporation and its shareholders
whenever the actions of the director concern matters affecting
the general well-being of the corporation. Thus, as a fiduciary
in this sense, a director's first duty is to act in all things of trust
wholly for the benefit of the corporation.' 9
Because directors do not hold legal title to the assets of the corporation, however, they are considered to be "implied trustees.''20
15
16
17

164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).

Id. at 546 (citations omitted).

See 3 FLETCHER

CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

§ 838,

at

177 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1986) ("[I]t is universally recognized that courts of equity
treat the relationship of director and stockholders as a trusteeship, in order to determine the rights, duties and liabilities of the directors .... ") (citations omitted)
[hereinafter FLETCHER]; see also Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85, 90-91 (6th Cir.

1939) ("A director of a corporation occupies a fiduciary relation to it and its stockholders. His position is one of trust and he is frequently denominated a trustee and
so held accountable in equity.").
18 Ashman, 101 F.2d at 91.
19 3 FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 838, at 178.
20 See id. at 179; cf. Stephen H. Case, Fiduciary Duty of Corporate Directors and Officers, Resolution of Conflicts Between Creditors and Shareholders, and Removal of Directors by
Dissident Shareholders in Chapter 11 Cases 13 in C371 ALI-ABA 1, 17 (Study Materials

for ALI-ABA's Williamsburg Conference on Bankruptcy, Oct. 17-19, 1988) ("The
role of the directors of the corporation is similar to that of the trustee under the
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The trustee theory is not the only view as to the nature of the
fiduciary relationship between directors and stockholders. Some
courts refer to directors as agents, while other courts refer to them
as agents as well as trustees. 2 '
Regardless of which theory is followed, directors remain the focal component of corporate governance. In carrying out its managerial role, a corporate director is charged with unyielding fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty, among others, to the corporation and its
stockholders.2 2 These fiduciary duties are the foundation of the law
of corporate governance. 23
2.

Duty of Care

The duty of care requires a director, as a corporate fiduciary,
to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily careful and prudent person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.2 4 A number of states have codified this standard of
conduct for directors in their statutory corporate law.2 5
will. They 'hold' property (i.e., corporate assets) for the benefit of others (i.e.,
shareholders) who are impeded from protecting themselves (e.g., because ...their
economic stake is too small to justify personal attention).").
21 See 3 FLETCHER, supra note 17, § 838, at 179-80; Anna Y. Chou, Corporate Governance In Chapter 11: Electing A New Board, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 559, 562 (1991).
22 See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
23 See e.g., Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 179
(Del. 1986); Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
Directors and officers also have the duty of obedience, which prohibits activities that are beyond the scope of power conferred by the articles of incorporation
and bylaws. However, this duty is not discussed in this Article.
24 See, e.g., Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196, 1209 (5th Cir. 1982) (" 'Due care' is
that degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the
same or similar circumstances."); Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d
125, 130 (Del. 1963) ("[D]irectors of a corporation in managing the corporate affairs are bound to use that amount of care which ordinarily careful and prudent
men would use in similar circumstances.").
A minority of courts require directors to exercise that amount of care that an
ordinarily prudent person would exercise in his personal affairs. See, e.g., Dykema v.
Muskegon Piston Ring Co., 82 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Mich. 1957) (directors must answer for ordinary neglect, which is "understood to be omission of that care which
every man of common prudence takes in regard to his own affairs"); FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1979) (in exercising
due care, directors must give the business such attention as an ordinarily discreet
businessman would give to his own concerns under similar circumstances).
25 This standard is also contained in § 8.30(a) of the Model Business Corporation Act, which provides:
A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties
as a member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
would exercise under similar circumstances; and
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In evaluating this duty, courts have adhered to the business
judgment rule, which has been the primary means of reviewing a
director's decisions for over 150 years.2 6 The business judgment
rule is a presumption that directors who made a business decision acted on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest
belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the corporation. 7 To invoke the protection of the business judgment rule,
directors have a duty to inform themselves of all material information reasonably available to them before making a business
decision. After becoming so informed, directors are required to
act with the requisite care in discharging their duties.2 8 If a director takes or approves an action that is detrimental to the corporation without an adequate independent basis, however, the duty of
care is breached.2 ' Thus, when directors make decisions, the
duty of care requires that such decisions be made:
* in good faith
" in the best interests of the corporation
* with the care that an ordinarily prudent person would
extend.
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation.
Model Business Corp. Act § 8.30(a) (1991).
Although Delaware does not statutorily codify the duty of care, the case law in
that jurisdiction sets forth the same standard as most of the state statutes. See Graham, 188 A.2d at 130.
26

See

DENNISJ. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES

OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 3 (3d ed. 1989) [hereinafter BLOCK].
27 See, e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Spiegel v. Buntrock,
571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. 1990); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988);
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); see also BLOCK, supra note 26, at 29
("The business judgment rule both shields directors from liability when its five elements - a business decision, disinterestedness, due care, good faith and no abuse
of discretion - are present and creates a presumption in favor of the directors that
each of these elements has been satisfied.").
28 SeeAronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
29 See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 27475 (2d Cir. 1986) ("Directors may be liable to shareholders for failing reasonably to
obtain material information or to make a reasonable inquiry into material matters."); see also CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1990) (requiring good faith and the
care of an ordinarily prudent person).
Courts differ in their articulation of the standard of culpability (i.e., ordinary
negligence, gross negligence, or recklessness) that is required in order to impose
liability for breaching the duty of care. See generally BLOCK, supra note 26, at 35-40
(discussing various standards). A number of courts impose liability only for conduct that amounts to gross negligence. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985); Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also Block & Hoff, supra note 14, at 6
(in practice, courts impose liability only for conduct rising to the level of gross
negligence).
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In addition, such decisions should be based upon the best information available and such professional advice as is appropriate.
3.

Duty of Loyalty

A corporate director also has a duty of loyalty to the corporation and its stockholders. The duty of loyalty prohibits selfdealing or the usurpation of corporate opportunities. 3 The basic concept underlying this duty is that a director should not use
his or her position in a corporation to obtain a personal advantage. The landmark decision of Guth v. Loft, Inc. 32 described this
duty as follows:
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their
position of trust and confidence to further their private interests .... A public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics
and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most
scrupulous observance of his duty ....The rule that requires
an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands
33
that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.
The duty of loyalty is derived form the bar against self-dealing
that is inherent in a fiduciary relationship. By assuming office, a director "commits allegiance to the enterprise and acknowledges that
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders must prevail over any individual interest of his own.""
Unlike the duty of care, good faith does not preclude a finding
that the duty of loyalty has been breached. Thus, a self-dealing
transaction will be sustained only if such transaction is objectively or
intrinsically fair.3 5
4.

Scope of Fiduciary Duties of Care and Loyalty

The primary obligations of the directors of a solvent corporation are to the stockholders of the corporation. The stockholders are the proprietors of the corporation and are ultimately the
30
31

See

32

5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).

BLOCK,

supra note 26, at 48-66.

See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984)
(duty of loyalty derives from the prohibition against self-dealing that inheres in the
fiduciary relationship).
33 Id. at 510.
34

Corporate Director's Guidebook, 33 Bus.

LAw.

1595, 1599 (1978).

35 See, e.g., AC Acquisition Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 115

(Del. Ch. 1986).
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beneficiaries of its growth and increased value. 36 Stockholders
have the right to expect that a director will cause the adoption of
appropriate policies and practices for the corporation, and that
the corporation's officers and management will execute such policies and practices in a professional and competent fashion.
In contrast, a director generally has no fiduciary obligations
to the creditors of a solvent corporation.3 7 Directors are not
trustees for a corporation's creditors. As one court aptly stated:
[I]t is difficult to perceive upon what principle a director of a
corporation can be considered a trustee to its creditors. He is
selected by the shareholders, not by creditors; he has no contractual relation with the latter; he represents a distinct entity,
the corporation; and his relations to its creditors is exactly the
same as the agent of an individual bears to creditors of such
individual; and it is not pretended that in the latter case the
agent would be the trustee of the creditors of his principal....
[B]y the great weight of authority such trust relation is dis38
tinctly repudiated, when the corporation is a going concern.
In fact, favoring creditors over stockholders may result in liability of
the directors to the affected stockholders.3 9
Creditors are only entitled to the protection afforded by the
terms of their contracts with the corporation. This principle was
aptly set forth in Simons v. Cogan,4" which held that a corporation
that issued convertible debentures did not owe any fiduciary duty to
the holders of such debentures. The court began its analysis by explaining that a debenture is a credit instrument that does not devolve upon its holder an equity interest in the issuing corporation,
See Ashman v. Miller, 101 F.2d 85, 91 (6th Cir. 1939).
See, e.g., C-T of Va., Inc. v. Barrett, 124 B.R. 689 (W.D. Va. 1990); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Simons v.
Cogan, 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988). Thus, one court has stated that while a board of
directors
may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibilities, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the
stockholders, . . . such concern for non-stockholder interests is inappropriate when an auction among active bidders is in progress, and
the object no longer is to protect or maintain the corporate enterprise
but to sell it to the highest bidder.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986).
38 Webb v. Cash, 250 P. 1, 8 (Wyo. 1926).
39 See Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182-84 (board of directors breached its primary fiduciary duties when it entered into lockup agreement with potential buyer on basis of
impermissible considerations of noteholders' interests at expense of interests of
stockholders).
40 549 A.2d 300 (Del. 1988).
36
37
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and that the convertibility feature does not impart an equity element
until the debenture is in fact converted. 4 ' A convertible debenture
thus "represents a contractual entitlement to the repayment of a
debt and does not represent an equitable interest in the issuing corporation necessary for the imposition of a trust relationship with
concomitant fiduciary duties."' 4 2 Before such a fiduciary duty arises,
"an existing property right or equitable interest supporting such a
duty must exist."' 43 Until the debenture is converted into stock, the
convertible debenture holder remains a creditor of the corporation
whose interests are only protected by the contractual terms of the
indenture.4 4
Although directors generally do not owe fiduciary duties to the
creditors of a solvent corporation, there are certain instances in
which directors do owe fiduciary duties to creditors and other third
parties. For example, directors of banking institutions owe fiduciary
duties to depositors. 45 A number of cases have held that directors
are trustees for such creditors.4 6 Similarly, directors of nonbanking
corporations that hold funds in trust owe fiduciary duties to the
owners of such funds by characterizing the status of the beneficiaries
of the trust as similar to those of bank depositors.4 7 The trust relationship thus gives rise to a fiduciary duty to guard the trust funds
with fidelity and in good faith.48
Finally, in response to the wave of takeovers during the 1980's,
many states enacted "constituency" statutes in order to give directors leeway to consider constituencies other than stockholders.4 9
41

Id. at 303.

42

Id.

43

Id. at 304.

44 Id.
45 See, e.g., Irving Bank Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,

845 F.2d 1035, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (fiduciary duty to protect stockholders and
depositors).
46 See, e.g., Masi v. Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 779 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir.
1985) (IRAs are "special deposits that constitute a trust relationship wherein the
Bank owes a fiduciary duty to the depositor"); Commercial Cotton Co. v. United
Cal. Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ("A depositor in a noninterest-bearing checking account ... is totally dependent on the banking institution
to which it entrusts deposited funds and depends on the bank's honesty and expertise to protect them ....
The relationship of bank to depositor is at least quasifiduciary .... ").
47 See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981) (director of
reinsurance brokerage corporation found negligent in not noticing or trying to prevent other directors' misappropriation of funds held by corporation in implied
trust).
48 See id. at 825.
49 Statutes enacted in Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, II-
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These statutes permit or require directors responding to takeover
bids to consider the interests of creditors, suppliers, employees,
consumers, and, in some states, the local and national economies as
well as society in general.5 0 Generally, these statutes are precatory;
it is not compulsory that directors consider the interests of such
constituencies.5 1 In fact, some constituency statutes expressly state
that they do not "create any duties owed by any director to any person or entity to consider or afford any particular weight" to any
nonstockholder constituents.5 2
C. Fiduciary Duties of Directors of an Insolvent CorporationNot
Subject to a Case Under the Bankruptcy Code
Although corporate directors have fiduciary obligations to
the stockholders, rather than the creditors, of a solvent corporation, upon the occurrence of the corporation's insolvency there is
imposed upon the directors the additional burden of fiduciary responsibilities to creditors of the corporation. This expansion of
the scope of a director's fiduciary duties raises the question at
what point does a corporation become insolvent so that the enlarged scope of responsibility imposed by the law becomes effective. Additionally, the nature and extent of the fiduciary duties of
directors to creditors of an insolvent corporation is unclear.
1.

Definition of Insolvency

Insolvency "'is a most important and material fact [and] the
mere fact of its existence may change radically and materially [a
corporation's] rights and obligations.'
The term "insolvent"
has been defined in various ways. The Bankruptcy Code and
state law definitions involve different variations of formulas that
compare assets and liabilities. For example, the Bankruptcy
Code defines the term "insolvent" as follows:
(A) with reference to an entity other than a partnership
",53

linois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Wyoming explicitly permit or require consideration of
nonshareholder constituencies or long-term corporate interests, either generally or
with respect to contests for control of the corporation.
50 See BLOCK, supra note 26, at 171-72.
51 But see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1992) (with regard to
sales of all or substantially all of a corporation's assets, a director is required to
consider the interests of the corporation's creditors).
52 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1993).
53 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 357 (1985)
(quoting McDonald v. Williams, 174 U.S. 397, 404 (1899)).
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and a municipality, financial condition such that the sum of
such entity's debts is greater than all of such entity's property,
at a fair valuation, exclusive of (i) property transferred, concealed, or removed with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud such entity's creditors; and
(ii) property that may be exempted from property of the
estate under section 522 of this title ....54
Similarly, the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act provides that a
debtor is insolvent "if the sum of the debtor's debts is greater than
all of the debtor's assets at a fair valuation," and presumes that a
debtor "who is generally not paying his [or her] debts as they become due" is insolvent. 55 A different definition of the term "insolvent" is found in New York Debtor and Creditor Law, which
provides that a debtor is insolvent "when the present fair salable
value of his assets is less than the amount that will be required to
pay his probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and matured."' 56 The statutes span the historical dichotomy of
"equitable insolvency ' 57 and "bankruptcy" or "balance sheet
insolvency."8
The issue of when a corporation is insolvent for purposes of
defining the fiduciary duties of directors was recently considered in
two decisions of the Delaware Court of Chancery. In Credit Lyonnais
Bank Nederland, N. V v. Pathe Communications Corp. ,9 the court concluded that a corporation may be insolvent for purposes of enlarging the directors' fiduciary responsibilities before the corporation
commences formal bankruptcy proceedings: "At least where a corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors
is not merely the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty
to the corporate enterprise." ' 60 The court explained that when directors manage a solvent corporation
in the vicinity of insolvency, circumstances may arise when the
right (both the efficient and the fair) course to follow for the
corporation may diverge from the choice that the stockholders
(or the creditors, or the employees, or any single group inter54 11

U.S.C. § 101(32) (1988).

55 Unif. Fraudulent Transfer Act § 2(a),(b), 7A U.L.A. 648 (1985).
56 N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. LAw § 271 (McKinney 1990).
57 Equitable insolvency is defined as the inability to pay one's debts as they mature irrespective of balance sheet reporting of asset values in excess of reported
liabilities.
58 Bankruptcy or balance sheet insolvency is defined as balance sheet negative
net worth, i.e., the book value of assets is less than reported liabilities.
59 No. CIV.A.12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
60 Id. at *34 (emphasis added).
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ested in the corporation) would make if given the opportunity
to act. 6 1
The same court reached a similar conclusion in Geyer v. Ingersoll
Publications Co.62 In Geyer, the plaintiff instituted an action against
Ingersoll Publications Co.("IPCO") and Ralph Ingersoll II ("Ingersoll"), the President, Chairman of the Board, and controlling stockholder of IPCO, alleging, inter alia, breaches of fiduciary duties,
fraudulent conveyances, and the right to a judgment on a promissory note. Ingersoll moved to dismiss all of the plaintiff's claims
and to stay discovery pending resolution of his motion. In connection with this motion, Ingersoll asserted that fiduciary duties to
creditors do not arise until a formal insolvency proceeding is commenced under state or federal bankruptcy law. The issue revolved
around Ingersoll's claim that he was not subject to the jurisdiction
of Delaware since his only contacts with that state were as a consequence of serving as a director of IPCO. In that capacity, Ingersoll
alleged that his only fiduciary responsibilities extended to stockholders under Delaware law and that his implicit appointment of the
Secretary of State as agent for process was only available to the
stockholders of IPCO. Accordingly, Ingersoll argued that he owed
no obligation to creditors beyond the relevant contractual terms,
absent fraud, insolvency, or the violation of a statute.
The court disagreed and determined that "insolvency in fact"
gives rise to fiduciary duties of directors in favor of creditors. In
defining insolvency for the purpose of determining when fiduciary
duties to creditors arise, the court noted that " '[t]he fact which creates the trust [for the benefit of creditors] is the insolvency, and
when that fact is established, the trust arises, and the legality of the
acts thereafter performed will be decided by very different principles than in the case of solvency.' "68 The court also relied on the
ordinary meaning of the term "insolvency" in reaching its
conclusion:
[According to Webster's Dictionary, an] entity is insolvent
when it is unable to pay its debts as they fall due in the usual
course of business. That is, an entity is insolvent when it has
liabilities in excess of a reasonable market value of assets held.
Although there may be other definitions of insolvency that are
slightly different, [this court is] not aware of any authority
which indicates that the ordinary meaning of the word insol61 Id.at *36 n.55.
62 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).
63 Id. at 787 (quoting Bovay v. H.M. Byllesby & Co., 38 A.2d 808, 813 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1944)) (alteration in original).
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vency means the institution of statutory proceedings. 6 4
The court emphasized the policy concerns involved in its interpretation of determining when a corporation should be considered
insolvent:
[I]t is efficient and fair to cause the insolvency exception to
arise at the moment of insolvency in fact rather than waiting
for the institution of statutory proceedings. The existence of
the fiduciary duties at the moment of insolvency may cause directors to choose a course of action that best serves the entire
corporate enterprise rather than any single group interested in
the corporation at a point in time when shareholders' wishes
should not be the directors' only concern.6 5
Thus, under recent case law, the ordinary meaning of the term "insolvency" as well as policy considerations lead to the conclusion that
it is the fact of insolvency, rather than the institution of statutory
proceedings, that causes the fiduciary duties to creditors to arise.
2.

The Expansion of Fiduciary Duties to Creditors

Whatever measure is used to determine the point at which a
corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duties of directors
are deemed to have significantly expanded to include a responsibility to creditors.6 6 When the point of insolvency is reached, the
directors are sometimes deemed trustees for the benefit of corporate creditors.
While the law clearly indicates that directors of insolvent
corporations owe fiduciary duties to creditors, the courts are split
with respect to whether such directors continue to owe fiduciary
duties to stockholders as well. A number of courts have stated
64 Id. at 789. Note that the court, in effect, has merged in one succinct paragraph the equitable and bankruptcy definitions of insolvency to support its conclusions and the rationale that Ingersoll's fiduciary duties extended to IPCO's
creditors.
65 Id. (citations omitted).
66 See, e.g., Unsecured Creditors Comm. of STN Enters., Inc. v. Noyes (In re STN
Enters.), 779 F.2d 901, 904 (2d Cir. 1985) ("although in most states directors of a
solvent corporation do not owe a fiduciary duty to creditors, quite the reverse is true
when the corporation becomes insolvent").
67 See, e.g., Automatic Canteen Co. v. Wharton (In re Continental Vending Mach.
Corp.), 358 F.2d 587, 590 (2d Cir. 1966); Bank Leumi-Le-Israel, B.M. v. Sunbelt
Indus., Inc., 485 F. Supp. 556, 559 (S.D. Ga. 1980) ("In the case of an insolvent
corporation, the directors and officers stand as trustees of corporate properties for
the benefit of creditors first and stockholders second."); In rejersey Materials Co.,
50 F. Supp. 428, 430 (D.NJ. 1943) (director "had the responsibility of a fiduciary
or quasi fiduciary to the stockholders of his company during its solvency and when
it became insolvent this responsibility was extended to its creditors").
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that when a corporation becomes insolvent, its directors no
longer represent the stockholders. 68 Thus, at the point of insolvency, the fiduciary obligations of the directors "shift[ ] from the
stockholders to the creditors." 69
In contrast, other courts have concluded that directors of an
insolvent corporation owe fiduciary duties to both creditors and
stockholders. 70 Because of their position as fiduciaries, directors
of an insolvent corporation are characterized as trustees of corporate properties for the benefit of creditors first and stockholders second. 7 '
All courts are in agreement, however, that when a corporation becomes insolvent, its directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors. Several rationales have been used to support this rule.
The majority view is that when a corporation becomes insolvent,
a creditor's interest becomes an equitable interest in the assets of
the corporation:
The law by the great weight of authority seems to be settled that when a corporation becomes insolvent, or in a failing
condition, the officers and directors no longer represent the
stockholders, but by the fact of insolvency, become trustees
for the creditors, and that they cannot by transfer of its property or payment of cash, prefer themselves over other creditors

.... 72

Other jurisdictions, however, employ a trust fund theory. This
doctrine does not involve the application of an actual "trust," but
rather provides that a court will administer the assets of an insolvent
corporation among its creditors first and thereafter among its stockholders. 7' After describing this theory as a "source of confusion,"
one court explained the trust fund doctrine as follows:
When a court of equity does take into its possession the assets
See, e.g., FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 977 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
461 U.S. 928 (1983).
69 Id.
70 See, e.g., Sanford Fork & Tool Co. v. Howe Brown & Co., 157 U.S. 312 (1895)
(directors of insolvent corporation, which was still a going concern intending to
continue its business, stand in a fiduciary relation to both stockholders and creditors); Committee of Creditors of Xonics Medical Sys., Inc. v. Haverty (In re Xonics,
Inc.), 99 B.R. 870, 872 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) ("When a corporation is insolvent its
officers and directors stand in a position of trust not only to the corporation and its
shareholders, but also to its creditors.").
71 See, e.g., Bank Leumi-Le-Israel, 485 F. Supp. at 559.
72 Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d at 977 (quoting Davis v. Woolf, 147 F.2d 629, 633 (4th
Cir. 1945)).
68

73 See WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS

& DIRECTORS § 5.05, at 167 (4th ed. 1988).
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of an insolvent corporation, it will administer them on the theory that they in equity belong to the creditors and stockholders rather than to the corporation itself. In other words, and
that is the idea which underlies all these expressions in reference to "trust" in connection with the property of a corporation, the corporation is an entity, distinct from its stockholders
as from its creditors. Solvent, it holds its property as any individual holds his, free from the touch of a creditor who has acquired no lien; free also from the touch of a stockholder who,
though equitably interested in, has no legal right to, the property. Becoming insolvent, the equitable interest of the stockholders in the property, together with their conditional
liability to the creditors, places the property in a condition of
trust, first, for the creditors, and then for the stockholders.
Whatever of trust there is arises from the peculiar and diverse
equitable rights of the stockholders as against the corporation
in its property and their conditional liability to its creditors. It
is rather a trust in the administration of the assets after possession by a court of equity than a trust attaching to the property,
as such, for the direct benefit of either creditor or
stockholder."4
A third theory that explains why fiduciary duties are owed to
creditors of an insolvent corporation was recently enunciated in
Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N. V. v. Pathe Communications Corp.75
The court observed that creditors of a corporation that is approaching insolvency are exposed to high-risk strategies in order to enhance earnings: "The possibility of insolvency can do curious things
to incentives, exposing creditors to risks of opportunistic behavior
and creating complexities for directors." 7 6 The court concluded
that the directors of a corporation that is in the vicinity of insolvency
should view the corporation as a "community of interests." Thus,
rather than choosing to take a riskier action for the benefit of stock74 American Nat'l Bank v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica
Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266, 1269 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting Hollins v. Brierfield Coal &
Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371, 383 (1893)).
Other courts have described the trust fund theory somewhat differently:
Quasi trustees must be held to accountability for the performance of
obligations thrust upon them by circumstances. The safety and protection of the trust res is of primary significance. If the assets - the
trust fund of the creditors - were actually improvidently wasted or
depleted as a result of defendants' unilateral action the plaintiff is entitled to recover the amount of the loss thus sustained.
New York Credit Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Weiss, 110 N.E.2d 397, 400
(N.Y. 1953).
75 No. CIV.A.12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
76 Id. at *36 n.55.
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holders, directors should be "capable of conceiving of the corporation as a legal and economic entity" by considering the "community
77
of interests that the corporation represents.
Regardless of which rationale is used, directors of insolvent corporations owe undefined fiduciary duties to the corporation's creditors the way that directors of solvent corporations owe fiduciary
duties to the corporation's stockholders. For example, the business
judgment rule continues to be the standard for reviewing the conduct of directors of an insolvent corporation.7 ' The rationale for
continuing to use this standard of review for insolvent corporations
is that courts "must be able to rely on officers' and directors' actions, even for an insolvent corporation unless those seeking damages show that such actions are venal. To require less in assessing
breach of fiduciary duty ... would constrain the commercial world
79
in developing means to aid the floundering corporation.
Whether the fiduciary duties require disregard of the interests of the
corporation as an entity and its stockholders in the pursuit of a paramount objective to satisfy the claims of creditors is undetermined.
Similarly, whether the fiduciary duties imposed are limited to
preventing unfair or unequal distributions to creditors of the same
rank is ambiguous. The only clear and undisputable principle is that
insolvency of the corporation triggers an expanded responsibility
upon directors. It adds to the beneficiary classes that have a right to
call a director their "fiduciary." This appellation, in turn, serves to
raise the consciousness and sensitivities of the directors in dealing
with the corporation's business and interested parties.
II.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS OF A CORPORATION IN

CHAPTER 11

A.

Fiduciary Duties of Debtors in Possession

As in the case of an insolvent corporation independent of
bankruptcy, the directors of a corporation in a chapter 11 bankruptcy case have fiduciary duties to the multiple constituencies
usually involved in such cases. The Supreme Court described
these fiduciary duties as follows:
[Directors are fiduciaries whose] powers are powers in trust.
Their dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous
scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with
77 Id.

78 See, e.g., Committee of Creditors of Xonics Medical Sys., Inc. v. Haverty (In re
Xonics, Inc.), 99 B.R. 870, 876 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989).
79 Id.
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the corporation is challenged the burden is on the director or
stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction
but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the
corporation and those interested therein. The essence of the
test is whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length bargain. If it does
not, equity will set it aside. While normally that fiduciary obligation is enforceable directly by the corporation, or through a
stockholder's derivative action, it is, in the event of bankruptcy
of the corporation, enforceable by the trustee. For that standard of fiduciary obligation is designed for the protection of
the entire community of interests in the corporation - creditors as well as stockholders. 80
Upon the filing of a chapter 11 case, the board of directors,
through the management of the debtor corporation, continues to
operate the business and manage the assets as a DIP.8 A DIP acts
qua trustee under the Bankruptcy Code. 2 It has primary responsibility for the administration and protection of the debtor's estate
unless a trustee is appointed. Nevertheless, the DIP is the debtor
and, as such, is subject to the normal rules of corporate governance
as limited by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Consequently,
the directors of the debtor continue to have fiduciary obligations to
the debtor's creditors, other constituencies, and the entity, which
are further enlarged by the duties and obligations imposed by the
3
Bankruptcy Code.

The Supreme Court established the applicable principle of law
in Wolfv. Weinstein, 4 which involved a proceeding under Chapter X
of the former Bankruptcy Act.8 5 In that case, in which a trustee was
not appointed, the Court held, inter alia, that the district court correctly concluded that the debtor's President and General Manager
were "fiduciaries" within the meaning of § 249 of the former Bankruptcy Act and that, as the officers of the debtor in possession performing those functions that would otherwise be performed by a
80 Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) (citations omitted).
81 See II U.S.C. § 1108 (1988).
82 See, e.g., Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, BusinessJudgment, Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1,
21 (1989) ("the DIP is most closely associated with the management of the business:
the officers, directors, retained professionals, and business managers") [hereinafter
Nimmer & Feinberg].
83 See, e.g., MARTINJ. BIENENSTOCK, BANKRUPTCY REORGANIZATION 72-76 (4th ed.

1987).
84 372 U.S. 633 (1963).
85 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
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disinterested trustee, they held similar responsibilities and obligations to the debtor's creditors and stockholders:
[S]o long as the Debtor remains in possession, it is clear that
the corporationbears essentially the same fiduciary obligation to
the creditors as does the trustee for the Debtor out of possession ....
[I]n practice these fiduciary responsibilities fall not
upon the inanimate corporation, but upon the officers and
managing employees who must conduct the Debtor's affairs
under the surveillance of the court.8 6
The Court explained that the concept of allowing a debtor to remain in possession is "premised upon an assurance that the officers
and managing employees can be depended upon to carry out the
fiduciary responsibilities of a trustee. "87
This principle remains applicable to a case under chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Code. Section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that a DIP "shall perform all the functions and duties . . . of a
trustee serving in a case under" chapter 11, with certain exceptions.8 8 In addition, the Supreme Court continued to follow its Wolf
v. Weinstein rationale in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub.89 In Weintraub, the Court held that the trustee of a debtor corporation has the power to waive the corporation's attorney-client
privilege with respect to prebankruptcy communications. By looking at the "roles played by the various actors of a corporation in
bankruptcy to determine which is most analogous to the role played
by the management of a solvent corporation," the Court concluded
that the trustee is the party that is most analogous to that of a solvent corporation's management and thus controls the attorney-client privilege.9 ° Citing Wolfv. Weinstein, the Court reaffirmed that "if
a debtor remains in possession - that is, if a trustee is not appointed - the debtor's directors bear essentially the same fiduciary
obligation to creditors and shareholders as would the trustee for a
debtor out of possession." 9 '
Thus, a DIP, which encompasses the board of directors, is required to act as a fiduciary for both the creditors and stockholders of
the corporation and perhaps other interests within the "community
of interests" in the debtor corporation. The courts have recognized
that a DIP owes the twin duties of care and loyalty to its creditors
86
87
88
89

Wolf, 372 U.S. at 649-50 (citations omitted).

Id. at 651.
11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988).
471 U.S. 343 (1985).

90 Id. at 351-53.

91 Id. at 355.
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and stockholders. These standards are similar to the standards that
are used with respect to directors of corporations operating outside
of bankruptcy. The business judgment rule continues to be the applicable standard for reviewing the actions of the DIP. Similarly, the
courts have recognized that a DIP owes the duty of loyalty to its
creditors and stockholders.9 2
B.

Balancing Fiduciary Duties in Insolvent Chapter 11 Corporations

A chapter 11 debtor clearly has fiduciary duties to the involved constituents, including secured creditors, senior and junior unsecured creditors, and stockholders.9" These constituents
often have conflicting interests and often disagree with each
other as to the desirability of reorganization and rehabilitation,
the management of assets, the conduct of the debtor's business,
and the provisions of a plan of reorganization. 9 4 In that context,
the "fiduciary duty notion seems to direct management to do the
best it can in a difficult situation." 9 5
The Bankruptcy Code does not clearly resolve this tension.
It provides that the debtor as a DIP represents the estate.9 6 As a
result, the DIP must act to benefit the estate as a whole:
Once a corporation becomes a debtor under [c]hapter 11,
its directors are no longer allowed to pursue parochial interests but have broader fiduciary obligations which encompass
all aspects of the reorganization. . . . These directors are
92 See, e.g., Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 647 (1963); Fulton State Bank v.
Schipper (In re Schipper), 112 B.R. 917, 919 (N.D. Ill. 1990), aff'd, 933 F.2d 513
(7th Cir. 1991).
93 See, e.g., Martin J. Bienenstock, Conflicts Between Management and the Debtor in
Possession'sFiduciary Duties, 61 CINCINNATI L. REV. 543 (1992), which described the
complexity of these duties as follows:
In the context of Chapter 11, the formulation of the debtor in possession's fiduciary duties is complex because the debtor in possession
must act on behalf of numerous other parties having conflicting interests, such as creditors holding secured claims, senior unsecured
claims, and junior unsecured claims, in addition to, shareholders, customers, and the public interest, in some situations. To determine a
debtor in possession's fiduciary duties is at least as complex as simultaneously solving multiple equations for as many variables as there
are different categories of parties in interest.
Id. at 543 n.2.
94 See, e.g., Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 82, at 36 ("In Chapter 11 .... cases
often arise where the interests of unsecured creditors conflict with those of secured
creditors, while the interests of both creditors conflict with those of the owners.").
95 Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy Reorganization, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 89, 119 (1992).
96 11 U.S.C. §§ 323(a); 1107(a) (1988).
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bound to act in the best interest of the corporation, in good
faith, and are answerable for their actions.97
Afortiorari, during the administration of a chapter 11 case, the directors of a debtor corporation are bound to act as fiduciaries for the
various constituencies and serve the best interests of the entity. 98
The debtor in discharge of its fiduciary responsibilities must devise
a means to deal with the diverse interests of the different constituencies so that the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code are achieved without charges of favoritism or breach of fiduciary duties.9 9
97 Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In reJohns-Manville Corp.), 52
B.R. 879, 885 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 60 B.R. 841 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 801 F.2d
60 (2d Cir.), on remand, 66 B.R. 517 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (citations omitted).
98 See, e.g., In re Central Ice Cream Co., 836 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1987), which
involved an appeal of the trustee's application to approve a settlement agreement.
In that case, the debtor won a $52 million verdict in state court in a suit against
McDonald's Corp. This suit was the estate's principal asset. McDonald's filed posttrial motions but offered a settlement of $15.5 million if the debtor accepted before
the trial court acted. The debtor's board of directors accepted and the bankruptcy
court approved the settlement. The stockholders appealed this decision. The district court dismissed the stockholders' appeal and awarded sanctions against their
attorneys. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that the
appeal of the bankruptcy court's approval of the settlement was not frivolous so as
to warrant imposition of sanctions. In reaching this decision, the court declared the
following:
The trustee preferred the creditors over the shareholders. The
trustee's counsel . . . testified that in negotiating the settlement he
"did not consider the interest of shareholders." This is an unusual
posture for a trustee, whose duty is to maximize the value of the estate, not of a particular group of claimants. Central Ice Cream had
assets sufficient to pay all creditors. This made the shareholders the
residual claimants; each additional dollar would go to them. It is true
...that spurning the settlement would expose the creditors to risk,
but this parallels the risk creditors face outside of the bankruptcy process as firms try to maximize the expected value of the enterprise.
The bankruptcy court should try to implement, rather than alter,
nonbankruptcy entitlements. Both shareholders and creditors have
such entitlements.
Id. at 1072 (citations omitted).
In a footnote, however, the court noted that the stockholders could have
purchased the debtor so that the stockholders would be risking their own money,
rather than the creditor's money: "Any risk to the creditors could have been eliminated by putting the firm up for sale. The sale would have produced a pot of cash
from which claims would have been satisfied.... The potential buyers in a case like
this include . . . the putative stockholders." Id. at 1072 n.3. Thus, the court attempted to address the conflict between the debtor's creditors and stockholders
without resolving the issue.
99 See, e.g., Nimmer & Feinberg, supra note 82, at 34, which described the DIP's
fiduciary duties as follows:
The fiduciary obligations of the [debtor's] officers and directors
require that they structure their actions and choices in a way that reflects an honest and reasoned effort to balance the competing inter-
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This tension is exacerbated in those situations in which the
debtor unequivocally is insolvent, with little hope of enhancing values to attain solvency. Because the Bankruptcy Code provides that
creditors have priority over stockholders in the hierarchy of dividends and distributions of consideration, the argument may be
made that an insolvent debtor should pursue actions that further the
interests of creditors despite the potentially negative effect on its
stockholders. Because stockholders of an insolvent debtor are entitled to no distribution under a plan of reorganization if the absolute
priority rule is applied, the argument may be made that stockholders of an insolvent corporation in chapter 11 have no pecuniary interest in the case and should not have any standing to be heard to
impede the progress of the case. This conclusion is suggested by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a footnote in Manville Corp. v. Equity Security Holders Committee (In reJohnsManville Corp.).'0 ° In the context of a corporate governance dispute
as to the election of directors, the court commented that if Manville
were determined to be insolvent, so that the stockholders lacked any
equity interest in the corporation, it might be proper to reject the
demand on their part to call a stockholders' meeting because they
"would no longer be real parties in interest."' 0 '
The view that a debtor owes no duties to the stockholders of an
insolvent corporation in chapter 11 is, however, contrary to the
scheme and purposes underlying the chapter 11 reorganization provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. The legislative history indicates
that Congress intended stockholders to have a role in a debtor's
reorganization:
In a large public company, whose interests are diverse and
complex, the most vulnerable today are public investors who
own subordinated debt or equity securities. The bill . . .is
designed to counteract the natural tendency of a debtor in distress to pacify large creditors with whom the debtor would expect to do business, at the expense of small and scattered
public investors ....
[I]t should be emphasized that investor protection is most
ests present in a chapter 11 case. These obligations do not require
that the [debtor] elevate one interest to the exclusion of the other, nor
do they require that each be evenly balanced against the other. The
choices the [debtor] makes reflect the character of the insolvency proceedings, the causes of the bankruptcy, and the probable future of the
business.
100 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986). See infra notes 146-61 and accompanying text.
101 In reJohns-ManvilleCorp., 801 F.2d at 65 n.6.
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critical when the company in which the public invested is in
financial difficulties
and is forced to seek relief under the bank02
ruptcy laws.'

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is devoid of any indication
that stockholders of an insolvent corporation are stripped of corporate governance rights available under applicable nonbankruptcy
law absent a direct conflict with the bankruptcy law. Unlike the provisions of Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, which provided that
stockholders of an insolvent debtor had no right to vote for or
against a plan,'0 3 the Bankruptcy Code makes no distinction between solvent and insolvent corporations as to the right to participate in the formulation and acceptance of a plan of reorganization
and in the consideration to be distributed under the plan. 10 4 Indeed, one objective of chapter 11 is the confirmation of a consensual plan of reorganization without regard to solvency.'0 5
The Bankruptcy Code contemplates that, initially at least, the
debtor will lead the plan formulation process. Section 1121(b) of
the Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor the exclusive right to propose
a plan for 120 days from the outset of a chapter 11 case. 10 6 This
102 S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.
C.A.N. 5787, 5796.
103 See § 179 of the Bankruptcy Act, which provided:
After a plan has been accepted.., by or on behalf of creditors holding two-thirds in amount of the claims filed and allowed of each class,
and, if the debtor has not been found to be insolvent, by or on behalf
of stockholders holding the majority of stock ... of each class ... the
judge shall fix a hearing... for the consideration of the confirmation
of the plan ....
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, as amended by the Chandler Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 179,
52 Stat. 840, 892 (repealed 1978).
104 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1103(c) (1988) (equity committee may participate in the
formulation of a plan; no distinction between solvent and insolvent debtor); id.
§ 1126 (stockholder may accept or reject plan; no distinction between solvent and
insolvent debtor).
105 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 221 (1977), reprintedin 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6180, which states that
[t]he purpose of the reorganization.., case is to formulate and have
confirmed a plan of reorganization ....
In addition to certain other requirements, the Bankruptcy Act requires that the plan be accepted by a certain percentage of affected
creditors and stockholders before it may be confirmed and put into
operation. The consent requirement necessitates negotiation among
management, creditors and stockholders.... The result of the negotiations, the plan, is sent to all affected creditors and stockholders for
consent. If they agree, and if all of the other requirements of the law
are met, the court confirms the plan, and the debtor comes out of the
case as a reorganized company.
106 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b).
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period of exclusivity may be extended or contracted for cause.' 0 7
During this period of exclusivity, creditors and other parties in interest are not allowed to formally propose and file a competing reorganization plan. By granting this period of exclusivity, the
Bankruptcy Code gives the debtor a level of leverage to establish
bargaining parity with the involved constituencies to negotiate a
consensual plan of reorganization that will provide for the treatment
and consideration to be distributed in respect of creditor claims and
stockholder interests. This result is encouraged by the Bankruptcy
Code despite issues of solvency. In order to further the concept of a
consensual plan, § 1126(g) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that
the failure of a plan to entitle a class of stockholders to receive or
retain any property under the plan on account of their interest shall
be deemed a rejection of the plan by that class. l0 8 Such rejection
would prevent confirmation unless resort is made to the cramdown
power under § 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code. 10 9
Consistent with the objective of achieving a consensual plan of
reorganization is the provision allowing a class of prior claimants to
waive or relax the right to absolute priority in distributions under
the plan. The absolute priority rule requires each class of creditors
to be paid in full in cash or securities prior to the receipt or retention by any junior class of creditors or stockholders of any property
or interest in the reorganized enterprise."
By relaxing the absolute priority rule, the Bankruptcy Code enables senior classes to relinquish value to junior classes in order to effectuate a negotiated
consensual plan of reorganization. This major innovation of the
Bankruptcy Code provides a basis for the duty of a debtor to negotiate for some consideration for the stockholders of an insolvent corporation in the pursuit of a consensual plan of reorganization. This
duty must be tempered by the needs of the particular case and
should not impair the accomplishment of an effective and expeditious reorganization.
The use of the "cramdown" power provides an alternative confirmation standard."' It is called into play only at the option of the
proponent of a plan of reorganization. Section 1 129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code permits a court to confirm a plan of reorganization if it
"does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with reId. § 1121(d) (providing that courts may grant extensions on request of a
party in interest).
108 Id. § 112 6 (g).
109 Id. § 1129(b).
110 The absolute priority rule is codified at 11 U.S.C.§ 1129(b).
M See 11 U.S.C. § 1129.
107
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spect to each class of claims or interests that is impaired under, and
has not accepted, the plan."' 12 If a class of interests is impaired, the
court is required to value the business enterprise in order to determine the value of the interest of the stockholders."t 3
The cramdown power is a fallback provision intended to operate only in the event of a breakdown in negotiations for a consensual plan." 4 If a debtor were under no obligation to negotiate for
some recovery for stockholders when the debtor is insolvent, and
the deemed rejection of § 112 6 (g) of the Bankruptcy Code occurred, then cramdown would be the only means by which a plan
could be confirmed. This result would be contrary to one of the
main objectives of the Bankruptcy Code - the confirmation of a
consensual plan of reorganization. Manifestly, the notion that a
debtor has a duty to bargain for some recovery on behalf of stockholders of an insolvent debtor is implicit in the Bankruptcy Code.
The Bankruptcy Code provides further indication that a debtor
may properly negotiate plan treatment on behalf of stockholders despite the insolvency of the debtor. Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code contemplates a difference between liquidation value and going concern value. The continuation of the business operations of
an enterprise under chapter 11 is based on the assumption that
maintaining the productive assets of a debtor's business will preserve going concern values that may not be obtained by dismemberment or liquidation."'
Chapter 11 is premised upon the policy of rehabilitation. This
policy is predicated on the assumption that going concern value is
112
1S

Id. § 1129(b)(1).
Section 1129(b)(2) provides, in pertinent part:
For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be
fair and equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements:

With respect to a class of interests (i) the plan provides that each holder of an interest of such class
receive or retain on account of such interest property of a value, as of
the effective date of the plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed
amount of any fixed liquidation preference to which such holder is
entitled, any fixed redemption price to which such holder is entitled,
or the value of such interest; or
(ii) the holder of any interest that is junior to the interests of
such class will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such
junior interest any property.
Id. § 1129(b)(2).
114 See, e.g., Frost, supra note 95, at 96.
15 See generally ChaimJ. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Valuation in Bankruptcy, 32
UCLA L. REV. 1061, 1063-65 (1985).
(C)

1494

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1467

higher than liquidation value. 1 6 Because going concern evaluation
requires an evaluation of future operations, it is not always clear
whether a corporation is in fact insolvent for the purpose of establishing "reorganization value" for plan purposes. 1 7 While a corporation may appear to be insolvent on a balance-sheet-test basis, the
difference between liquidation value and going concern value may
not be crystal clear. It is this unknown area of value, which is dependent upon future operations, that provides the basis for participation by stockholders or, sometimes, junior creditors in the
reorganized entity. For a reasonable period of time, particularly in
the absence of an appointed representative committee of stockholders to represent stockholder interests pursuant to § 1102 of the
Bankruptcy Code,"' a debtor and its directors legitimately may seek
to negotiate for some recovery or retention of an interest by
stockholders.
The achievement of rehabilitation as contemplated by chapter
11 should lead to an increase in the value of the debtor, albeit in the
future. Nevertheless, this enhanced value might result in the stockholders' retaining some of the equity in the reorganized entity. In
fact, stockholders typically manage to keep a small percentage of the
equity of a corporation that has been reorganized under chapter 11.
While it may appear that stockholders no longer have any economic
interest in the debtor corporation, the policy of chapter 11 reorganization supports the proposition that stockholders retain some interest as part of the consensual process." 9 The notion that
116 See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 ("The premise of a business reorganization is that assets
that are used for production in the industry for which they were designed are more
valuable than those same assets sold for scrap.").
117 See, e.g., Steven R. Gross et al., Directors Face Risks in Workout; Shifting Duties,
NAT'L L.J., Apr. 15, 1991, at 19 ("Because a going-concern valuation uses techniques that are necessarily imprecise and involve forecasting possibly unpredictable
future events, one cannot always determine with certainty whether or not a struggling company is insolvent.").
118 11 U.S.C. § 1102.
119 See, e.g., Mark E. Budnitz, Chapter 11 Business Reorganizations and Shareholder
Meetings: Will the Meeting Please Come to Order, or Should the Meeting be Cancelled Altogether?, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1214 (1990), which states that the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code indicate that
Congress intended to make it clear that, even if insolvency may render
the shareholders' continued economic interests in the corporation
problematical, shareholders nevertheless retain their ownership interest. Therefore, it would be anomalous to interpret the Bankruptcy
Code to mean that once a corporation is insolvent directors no longer
owe any fiduciary duty to shareholders.
Id. at 1249.
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stockholders of an insolvent debtor are no longer real parties in in20
terest for purposes of reorganization is thus not well-founded.'
It is worth noting that stockholders are often an unrepresented
class in negotiating a plan of reorganization and thus must look to
the debtor to represent their interests. While the Bankruptcy Code
provides for the mandatory appointment of a creditors' committee, 21 it gives the court discretion to decide whether it is appropriate to appoint an equity security holders' or stockholders'
committee. 122
The Bankruptcy Code expressly authorizes committees to participate in the formulation of a plan of reorganization.' 2 3 The legislative history states that equity security holders' committees are to
serve as "the primary negotiating bodies for the formulation of the
plan of reorganization. They will represent the . . . equity security
holders from which they were selected. They will also provide supervision of the debtor in possession and of the trustee, and will pro24
tect their constituents' interests." 1
Thus, if a court decides to appoint an equity security holders'
committee, the interests of the stockholders will be represented in
the process of plan negotiations. Notwithstanding the existence of
an equity security holders' committee, however, directors continue
to have fiduciary obligations to the stockholders of a debtor corporation. 125 There is no dispute that directors of a debtor owe fiduci120 See generally Raymond T. Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans:
Absolute Priority and New Value Contributions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009 (1987), which states
that
a rule that disenfranchises shareholders based merely on the insolvency of the company reaches too broadly. It eliminates virtually any
protection for what are often cumulatively large investments and does
this based on an appraisal of assets indicating insolvency. Even if a
company is insolvent, the shareholder investment and resulting loss
are real and substantial. Describing the shareholders as no longer
real parties in interest is sophistry.
Id. at 1064.
121 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(l).
122 Section 1102(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that "the United States
trustee... may appoint additional committees.., of equity security holders as the
United States trustee deems appropriate." Id.
123 Id. § 1103(c)(3).
124 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 401 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6357 (emphasis added).
125 See, e.g., Anna Y. Chou, CorporateGovernance In Chapter 11: Electing A New Board,
65 AMER. BANKR. L.J. 559, 580 n.181 (1991) ("[T]here is a good argument that,
notwithstanding the existence of [an] equity holders' committee, the fiduciary obligations to the constituents represented by such a committee continue. Committees
accord the represented group additional protection and rights under § 1103 of the
Code and do not detract from protection by the fiduciary.").

1496

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1467

ary obligations to creditors, despite their being represented by the
mandatory creditors' committee. The same standard should apply
who are represented by an equity sewith respect to stockholders
126
committee.
holders'
curity
Courts frequently refuse the appointment of an equity security
holders' committee because of the expense involved and the often
clear case of insolvency. The absence of such a committee puts
stockholders at a disadvantage because they will not be singularly
represented during the process of negotiating a plan of reorganization. Such circumstances require the directors to cause the debtor's
representatives to attempt to negotiate some recovery on behalf of
the stockholders.
There may come a point of departure in the case, however,
when the debtor and its directors must recognize their responsibility
to the case as a whole and cease negotiating on behalf of stockholders if such negotiations would be unproductive. The directors
would be in danger of breaching their fiduciary duties to the debtor
and the other constituencies if they prolonged and frustrated the
reorganization case by fruitless negotiations for stockholders who
may not have any real equity interest in the corporation.
It is difficult to determine exactly when a director should desist
from causing continued negotiations for stockholders and still discharge their fiduciary obligations. However, it seems that when the
financial condition of a corporation is "hopelessly" insolvent, such
that there is little or no chance that stockholders would have any
equity interest in the corporation, a debtor's directors no longer
have any duty to pursue actions that may prejudice the debtor, its
business, and the interests of senior classes. 1 27 Thus, it has been
126 See, e.g., In re Evans Prods. Co., 58 B.R. 572 (S.D. Fla. 1985), in which the
court held that
[n]owhere in the Bankruptcy Code is it suggested that a committee
whose appointment is mandatory pursuant to Section 1102(a)(1) has
any greater or different rights or duties than a committee whose appointment is precatory pursuant to Section 1102(a)(2). Once appointed, their rights and responsibilities clearly are the same. The
rights and fiduciary duties of the Equity Committee are no different
from those of any committee appointed pursuant to Section 1102 in
these cases.
Id. at 575.
The
127 See generally Michael A. Gerber, The Election of Directors and Chapter 11 Second Circuit Tells Stockholders To Walk Softly and Carry A Big Lever, 53 BROOK. L. REV.
295, 354 (1987) ("[T]he debtor's financial condition should not be completely disThere will be cases in which a debtor is so obviously and hopelessly
regarded ....
insolvent that experts can agree that stockholders have no equity in the company
and no prospect of ever having any.").
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determined that when a debtor is insolvent beyond any real prospect of achieving solvency, the appointment of an equity security
holders' committee is unwarranted because "neither the debtor nor
the creditors should have to bear the expense of negotiating over
the terms of what is in essence a gift."' 2 8 Once it is clear that the
corporation's insolvency is immutable, any value the stockholders
would have been able to retain is eliminated and totally dependent
upon the creditors' willingness to relinquish value in pursuit of the
objective of the confirmation of a consensual plan. The occurrence
of such a factual situation limits the obligation and responsibility of
the directors to continue negotiations on behalf of stockholders.
III.

THE RIGHT OF STOCKHOLDERS TO CHANGE THE BOARD OF

DIRECTORS DURING A CHAPTER

11

PROCEEDING

Stockholders of a corporation reorganizing under chapter I1
are not powerless to challenge the actions of directors that may
result in harm to the corporation. To the contrary, stockholders
retain rights under applicable nonbankruptcy law to elect and remove directors despite the pendency of a bankruptcy or reorganization case.1 29 However, courts have refused to grant requests
for stockholders' meetings if such meetings would conflict with
the policies and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code or jeopardize
the reorganization of the debtor.
A.

Judicial Treatment of the Right to Compel a Stockholders' Meeting

Several tests have been used by courts in order to determine
whether to grant a stockholder's request for a stockholders'
meeting. One of the most commonly used tests is the "clear
abuse" test. This test was established over fifty years ago by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in the
landmark case of In reJ.P.Linahan, Inc. 130 In Linahan, the court
approved an involuntary petition for Chapter X relief under the
former Bankruptcy Act. The debtor was allowed to remain in
possession. A majority stockholder and creditor of the debtor
filed an answer in opposition, charging that the petition was not
filed in good faith and that adequate relief could be obtained
under Chapter XI of such Act. The stockholder subsequently
128 In re Emons Indus., Inc., 50 B.R. 692, 694 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
129 See, e.g., In re Bush Terminal Co., 78 F.2d 662, 664 (2d Cir. 1935); Lionel
Corp. v. Committee of Equity Sec. Holders of Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 30
B.R. 327, 330 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
130 111 F.2d 590 (2d Cir. 1940).
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asked the court to require the debtor to hold the regular annual
meeting of stockholders in order to elect directors, alleging that
the directors had not acted in the interests of the debtor or the
stockholders in consenting to the proceeding under Chapter X.
The stockholder also requested a special meeting of stockholders
in order to adopt a resolution that a proceeding under Chapter
XI, rather than Chapter X, should be filed by the debtor.
The Second Circuit held that the lower courts were in error
in denying leave to hold the annual stockholders' meeting and in
staying the special meeting:
It is the court's concern that the management of the business
does not pass into the hands of incompetent or untrustworthy
persons. The debtor has other parts to pay [sic], however, in a
proceeding for reorganization or for arrangement, parts not
directly concerned with management of the property during
the period of court control, such as submission to involuntary
proceeding and filing of plan, and over these the court ordinarily exercises no restraint. As to such matters the right of the majority of stockholders to be represented by directors of their own choice and
thus to control corporate policy is paramount
and will not be disturbed
3
unless a clear case of abuse is made out.1 '
With respect to their choice of the type of reorganization plan, "the
stockholders are entitled to elect directors who will abide by their
wishes, provided of course the directors chosen are not persons who
will injure the honest and efficient management of the corporate
property."' 13 2 The court, however, did not explain how to identify
the circumstances under which a clear case of abuse would exist.
The Second Circuit continued to use this standard in In re Potter
Instrument Co. 133 In Potter, a major stockholder sought to compel a
special stockholders' meeting in order to elect a new board of directors who would contest an arrangement under Chapter XI of the
former Bankruptcy Act that reduced the interests of stockholders in
favor of a Chapter X proceeding. The lower courts rejected the
stockholder's request on the ground that such a meeting would preclude confirmation of the plan, jeopardizing the rehabilitation of the
debtor:
Here, we have a situation of a disgruntled stockholder
who is frustrated in his efforts to smash the Companies which
he brought into being because he has been ousted from management and control.
132

Id. at 592 (emphasis added).
Id.

133

593 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1979).

131
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[T]o permit Potter to control the Debtors through the
election of a majority of the Board of Directors would sound
the death knell to the Debtors. His objection to the issuance
of stock to secured and unsecured creditors would require an
Amended Plan, new notice to creditors and new acceptances
solicited. There is no showing that interested3 4parties would
approve a plan without the issuance of stock.1
Based on the equitable powers of the bankruptcy court, the Second
Circuit held that, under the clear abuse standard, the lower courts
were justified in denying the request for a special meeting to elect
new directors because "such an election might result in unsatisfactory management and would probably jeopardize both [the
Debtor's] rehabilitation and the rights of creditors and stockholders
sounding the 'death knell' to the debtor as well as to [the stockholder] himself."' 3 5
The clear abuse test has continued to be the standard used by
courts in deciding cases under the Bankruptcy Code. For example,
in Lionel Corp. v. Committee of Equity Security Holders of Lionel Corp. (In re
Lionel Corp.),'s 6 a chapter 11 debtor brought an adversary proceeding in order to enjoin the committee of equity security holders from
prosecuting a state court action seeking an order compelling the
debtor and its board of directors to call and hold the debtor's 1982
and 1983 annual meetings of stockholders for the election of directors. The court refused to enjoin the state court action and refrained form deciding the merits of a "strictly corporate governance
controversy."' 3 7 It found nothing in the record that demonstrated
that holding an annual meeting would impede reorganization, noting that if a new board were elected, the reorganization might "take
an entirely different turn.' 3 The court went on to state that there
is
no demonstrable reason for denying shareholders their right
to an annual meeting despite the pendency of a reorganization
proceeding, and it would be an abuse of this Court's power to
preclude defendants-respondents herein from resorting, as
they have, to all available legal remedies including the state
court proceeding as a vehicle for asserting their fundamental
rights against Lionel, a New York Corporation, and its Board
'34

Id. at 474.

'35
136

Id. at 475.

137

Id. at 329.
Id. at 330.

138

30 B.R. 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983).
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of Directors.'3 9
In a recent bench ruling involving the chapter 11 case of Fairmont Communications Corporation,140 the bankruptcy court for the
Southern District of New York denied the request of a creditor/
stockholder to exercise its right to elect directors under a proxy that
was triggered by, inter alia, the nonpayment of notes. The court determined that the stockholder's remote financial interest in the
debtor because of its clear insolvency, coupled with the possible
economic harm to the debtor if a director was appointed in potential
violation of FCC regulations, constituted grounds for invoking the
clear abuse exception to the general rules of corporate governance.
Although most courts follow the clear abuse test, several other
courts have chosen to utilize a type of balancing test. For example,
in Saxon Industries, Inc. v. NKFW Partners,14 ' a stockholder, both individually and on behalf of the equity security holders' committee,
brought an action to compel an annual meeting in order to elect
directors notwithstanding the debtor's reorganization under chapter
11. The Delaware Supreme Court held that the alleged adverse effect of such a meeting did not overcome the right to compel the
election of directors. In reaching this decision, the court attempted
to strike a balance between Delaware's state corporation law and the
Bankruptcy Code. The court declared that the right of stockholders
to have a meeting to elect directors under section 211 of Delaware's
General Corporation Law is "virtually absolute."'14 2 Because Delaware law does not presume that stockholders act contrary to their
own best interests, the stockholders' motive to increase the payment
they would receive in the reorganization was irrelevant and thus did
not preclude their right to seek relief under section 21 1.14 In addition, the court held that insolvency did not divest the stockholders
139 Id. The state court ultimately ordered the board of directors to call the annual meetings:
[During bankruptcy] it is more important than in less turbulent and
more normal times that the shareholders have a voice in the crucial
decisions affecting their company's destiny. A period of crisis does
not justify officeholders retaining their positions indefinitely. Democracy, whether political or industrial, is capable of dealing with difficulty and crisis, and is not to be suspended on the pretext of exigency.
Committee of Equity Sec. Holders of the Lionel Corp. v. Lionel Corp., N.Y.L.J., June 28,
1983, at 6.
140 In re Fairmont Communications Corp., No. 92 B 44861 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar.
3, 1993), appeal docketed, No. 93 Civ. 2388 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1993). For a detailed
discussion of the facts of this case, see infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text.
141 488 A.2d 1298 (Del. 1984).
142 Id. at 1301.
143 Id.
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of their right to elect directors because the debtor remained in control of its affairs. 1 44 The court also rejected the debtor's affirmative
defenses of a potential proxy fight, the loss of an acquiring company's offer, the loss of valued sales employees, and the curtailment
of the debtor's trade credit as too speculative. The court thus concluded that the scales tipped in favor of holding the meeting because of the "strong Delaware policy behind the free exercise of a
stockholder's right to elect directors, and the absence of that focus
in the pending bankruptcy proceedings .. .
B.

The Manville Decisions

The most comprehensive decision concerning the right of
stockholders to change the board of directors during the pendency of a chapter 11 case involved the long-running chapter 11
reorganization of Johns-Manville Corporation ("Manville").146
On August 26, 1982, Manville, a leading manufacturer of asbestos, and twenty of its subsidiaries and affiliates filed for reorganization under chapter 11 as a result of Manville's actual and
contingent liabilities to thousands of persons who were exposed
to Manville products containing asbestos. Because of the long
latency period for asbestos-related injuries, Manville anticipated
that thousands of new lawsuits would be filed against it during
the next twenty to thirty years. Manville was also a defendant in
several lawsuits seeking recoveries for asbestos-related property
damage potentially resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in
liability. In addition to the committees that were appointed to
represent the interests of Manville's creditors and equity security
holders, the court appointed a committee to represent the interests of asbestos health claimants and a legal representative with
the powers of a committee to represent the future claimants, but
without
power
to
bind
such
persons
(the
"Legal
Representative").
For the next several years, the bankruptcy court extended
the period during which Manville retained the exclusive right to
file a reorganization plan. Manville experienced a great deal of
difficulty in formulating an acceptable plan of reorganization until August 2, 1985, when Manville announced that its board of
144

Id. at 1302.

145 Id.

146 Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In reJohns-Manville Corp.), 52
B.R. 879 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 60 B.R. 841 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 801 F.2d 60
(2d Cir.), on remand, 66 B.R. 517 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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directors and the Legal Representative approved an agreement
on principal elements of a reorganization plan (the "Principal Elements Agreement"), which would earmark billions of dollars for
payment to present and future asbestosis victims as well as to
others damaged by the asbestos products that Manville once
manufactured.
The committee of equity security holders (the "Equity Committee") did not voluntarily participate in the negotiations between Manville and the Legal Representative and was dissatisfied
with the Principal Elements Agreement, which would have resulted in a 90 percent dilution of existing stockholders' interests.
Viewing this prospect as evidence of the board's abdication of its
responsibilities to stockholders, on August 16, 1985, the Equity
Committee and Lion Dubin ("Dubin"), a Manville stockholder
and member of the Equity Committee, brought an action in the
Delaware Chancery Court seeking to compel a meeting of
Manville's stockholders pursuant to section 211 (c) of Delaware's
General Corporation Law (the "Delaware Action") so that new
directors might be elected to reconsider the proposed plan. In
response, Manville brought an action in the bankruptcy court to
enjoin the Delaware Action.
The bankruptcy court enjoined the Equity Committee and
Dubin from prosecuting the Delaware Action on the ground that
holding a stockholders' meeting would obstruct Manville's reorganization. 47 After describing the general reluctance of courts
to enjoin meetings of stockholders, the court stated that "[t]he
right to compel a shareholder's meeting is not absolute and the
existence of various circumstances, including the parties' progress in plan negotiations, can militate against allowing the meeting." 148 The circumstances justifying the injunction included the
recent progress in plan negotiations, the jeopardy that a meeting
posed to the process of reorganization, and the conduct of the
Equity Committee.' 4 9
The district court affirmed the decision of the bankruptcy
court.' 5 '

The court found that the bankruptcy court did not

enjoin the proceeding solely because of the possibility that a
stockholders' meeting might delay or alter the course of the reorId.
Id. at 887.
149 Id. at 887-88.
150 In reJohns-Manville Corp., 60 B.R. 842 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.
1986).
147

148
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ganization. Rather, the bankruptcy court found that holding a
meeting at this point in the reorganization process would seriously jeopardize any attempt at successfully reorganizing
Manville. In addition, the district court found the requisite clear
case of abuse in the motivation of the stockholders to either destroy any prospect for a successful reorganization or strengthen
its bargaining position.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the decision of the lower courts and remanded to the bankruptcy court.' 5 ' Beginning with the wellestablished rule that "the right to compel a shareholders' meeting for the purpose of electing a new board subsists during reorganization proceedings," the court stated that the Equity
Committee's right to call a meeting would only be impaired if the
Equity Committee was guilty of "clear abuse" in its attempt to
call one. 15 2 The court refused to agree that the Equity Committee's desire to attain more bargaining power in the negotiation
process, as opposed to a secret desire to destroy all prospects for
reorganization, constituted clear abuse: "The law... directs that
the shareholders' natural wish to participate in this matter of corporate governance be respected."' 15 Under this analysis, the
court concluded that
the shareholders' mere intention to exercise bargaining power
- whether by actually replacing the directors or by "bargaining away" their chip without replacing the board.. . - cannot
without more constitute clear abuse. Unless the Equity Committee were to bargain in bad faith - e.g., to demonstrate a
willingness to risk rehabilitation altogether in order to win a
larger share for equity - its desire to negotiate for a larger
share is protected.' 5 4

The court noted that the focus of the clear abuse inquiry is whether
rehabilitation will be "seriously threatened," rather than merely
delayed.' 5 5 The court then stated that an injunction against a stockholders' meeting would be appropriate if there is (1) clear abuse in
calling the meeting and (2) irreparable injury resulting from such a
meeting.' 56 However, the Second Circuit noted in a footnote that
151 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.), on remand, 66 B.R. 517

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
152 Id. at 64.
153 Id.
154 Id. at 65.
155 Id. at 66.
156 Id. at 68.
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the solvency or insolvency of a debtor may be significant in determining whether to restrain stockholders from exercising their voting
rights because stockholders of an insolvent debtor would no longer
1 57
be real parties in interest.
On remand, the bankruptcy court applied the standards sanctioned by the Second Circuit, made findings of fact, and held that
Manville was entitled to an injunction prohibiting the Equity Committee from calling the stockholders' meeting.'
The court concluded that the purpose of electing new directors was to withdraw
the existing plan of reorganization, which was the result of a "substantial but fragile consensus" that had been achieved after "four
years of often bitter and always arduous struggle."' 1 59 In addition,
the court doubted the ability of a new board of directors to achieve a
consensual reorganization plan within a reasonable period of
time. 16 The court thus concluded that the attempts of the Equity
Committee to call a stockholders' meeting constituted clear abuse
because such a meeting would "irrevocably injure the reorganization and thereby irreparably injure the parties in interest to this

reorganization."
C.

161

The Right to Demand Stockholders' Meetings When the Debtor Is
Insolvent

As discussed, supra, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit has indicated that the solvency or insolvency
of a debtor corporation may be significant in determining
whether stockholders should be permitted to exercise their right
to require a meeting to elect a new board of directors. 16 2 In footnote six of its decision in Manville Corp. v. Equity Security Holders
Committee (In reJohns-ManvilleCorp.),163 the court noted, in dicta,
that "if Manville were determined to be insolvent, so that the
shareholders lacked equity in the corporation, denial of the right
to call a meeting would likely be proper, because the sharehold'
ers would no longer be real parties in interest."'6
Upon closer
analysis, however, it becomes clear that, within certain con157 Id. at 65 n.6. See infra notes 162-71 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the effect of insolvency on the right to call a stockholders' meeting.
158 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 66 B.R. 517 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
159 Id. at 536.
160 Id. at 539.
161 Id. at 542.
162 See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
163 801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.), on remand, 66 B.R. 517 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986).
164 Id. at 65 n.6.
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straints, the insolvency of a debtor corporation should not prevent the stockholders from exercising their corporate governance
rights.
The Bankruptcy Code gives no indication that stockholders
of a corporation in chapter 11 have no role to play when a debtor
is insolvent. 6 5 In fact, a number of courts have concluded that
the insolvency of a corporation does not divest stockholders of
their right to elect a new board of directors.166 Moreover,
prohibiting stockholders from exercising their right to elect a
new board of directors would give the incumbent directors in
place at the commencement of a chapter
11 case of an insolvent
67
corporation a lack of accountability.
As discussed, supra, directors continue to have fiduciary obligations to the stockholders of an insolvent corporation in chapter
11.168 The legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code indicates
that the objective of chapter 11 is to "restructure a business's
finances so that it may continue to operate, provide its employees
with jobs, pay its creditors, and produce a return for its stockholders." 6 9 Divesting stockholders of their right to call a meeting and
elect directors in every situation would defeat this objective by
depriving stockholders of the opportunity to improve their treatment under a plan of reorganization. However, each case should
be decided on its facts and in the perspective of the determinative factors established by the appellate courts.
The ability to request a meeting to elect directors may also
be used as a bargaining chip in the reorganization process in order to obtain concessions from other parties. 70 Requesting such
a meeting need not result in the actual election of new directors.
The mere fact that a meeting is requested gives rise to the threat
of delaying the progress of a reorganization case. By forbearing
from holding a meeting to which they would otherwise be entiSee supra notes 102-20 and accompanying text.
166 The leading case espousing this position is Saxon Industries, Inc. v. NKFW Partners, which is discussed at supra notes 141-45 and accompanying text.
167 See, e.g., Nimmer, supra note 120, at 1064 ("if we eliminate all shareholder
control, we place far too much power and autonomy in the hands of
management").
168 See supranotes 102-20 and accompanying text.
169 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6179 (emphasis added).
170 See Manville Corp. v. Equity Sec. Holders Comm. (In reJohns-Manville Corp.),
801 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1986) ("the shareholders' mere intention to exercise bargaining power - whether by actually replacing directors or by 'bargaining away'
their chip without replacing the board. . - cannot without more constitute clear
abuse").
165
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tied, stockholders may be able to improve their treatment under
a plan of reorganization.' 7 ' There is no reason, absent compelling facts and circumstances of imminent prejudice or damage to
the entity and senior classes, why stockholders of an insolvent
corporation should not retain this bargaining chip to the same
extent as do stockholders of a solvent corporation.
D.

The Right of Preferred Stockholders to Elect Directors and the
Automatic Stay
1. The Right of Preferred Stockholders to Elect Directors

Unlike the conventional case in which common stockholders
seek to invoke their right to elect directors, preferred stockholders are unique in that their right to elect directors stems from a
default in the payment of dividends.' 72 Certificates of preferred
stock typically provide that if the issuing corporation fails to pay
dividends for a specified period of time, the preferred stockholders have the right to elect a certain number of directors to the
73

board. 1

Graselli Chemical Co. v. Aetna Explosives Co. 174 is an example of
an early decision involving an attempt by preferred stockholders
to exercise such rights. Decided under the former Bankruptcy
Act, Graselli involved the election of a new board of directors of a
company in receivership by holders of preferred stock whose voting rights were triggered by default in the payment of dividends.
The preferred stock was not entitled to any vote, except upon the
171 See generally Gerber, supra note 127, at 345 (noting that in Saxon Industries, Inc.
v. NKFW Partners, 488 A.2d 1298 (Del. 1984), stockholders received slightly better
treatment under the plan in exchange for forbearing from holding a meeting; in
Lionel Corp. v. Committee of Equity Security Holders of Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 30
B.R. 327 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983), the committee of equity security holders was allowed to name several directors to serve on the board for the first year after confirmation in exchange for forbearing from holding a meeting).
172 See, e.g., SEC v. Liberty Banking Corp., 240 F. 511 (2d Cir. 1957) ("Until five
successive annual dividends are paid, the new preferred stockholders... may name
three out of seven members of the board of directors. After five years, in the event
the debtor defaults in payment of 12 quarterly dividends, the preferred will be permitted to elect four of the seven directors .... "); Lacos Land Co. v. Lone Star
Indus., Inc. (In re New York Trap Rock Corp.), 141 B.R. 815 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1992) (preferred stockholders had right to elect four directors due to debtor's nonpayment of dividends).
173 See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Allied Stores Corp. (In re Federated Dep't
Stores, Inc.), 133 B.R. 886, 888 (S.D. Ohio 1991) ("Preferred Shares provided that
if in the event Allied failed to pay dividends for six consecutive quarters, the Preferred Shareholders were to automatically have the right to elect two directors to
Allied's Board of Directors.").
174 252 F. 456 (2d Cir. 1918).
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issue of placing a mortgage upon the company's property. However, when the company increased its common stock, it was provided that in the event there is a default in the payment of
dividends of the preferred stock for a period of eight months or
more, each share of preferred stock was entitled to nine votes.
The dividends on the preferred stock were paid regularly until a
receiver was appointed. Because the dividends had not been
paid for over eight months since such appointment, the right of
the preferred stockholders to vote had accrued.
Several days before the scheduled annual meeting, activity
among groups of the stockholders indicated that a contest for
control of the corporation was to be waged by the election of a
new board of directors and the submission of a plan of readjustment. A group of common stockholders sought to enjoin the
meeting, claiming that a meeting to elect directors would "place
in control a board of directors who would be unfavorable and
unjust to the interests of the common stockholders, and who will
assist in the adoption of the readjustment plan," resulting in irreparable injury to the majority of the common stockholders.' 75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court to enjoin the meeting:
The property is being successfully managed by the receivers; it
has very profitable contracts, and is, or will very shortly, be
able to pay all its indebtedness .... It can pay the arrears of
dividends on the preferred stock, and may retire the preferred
stock. If the dividends are paid, the right of the preferred
stock to vote on the basis of nine for one is eliminated, and,
when a meeting is held, the business policy of the corporation
can be determined by the will of the majority of common
stockholders. Therefore, the right of the preferred stockholders to vote being but temporary, with every prospect of the
common stockholders regaining control of the corporation,
the court should not lend its aid nor permit a group of preferred stockholders electing a board of directors176who would
permit this plan of readjustment to be adopted.
Accordingly, because the receivers were about to cure the dividend
arrearages which gave the preferred stockholders their voting
rights, the court held that the meeting should be stayed.
More recently, preferred stockholders defeated an attempt by
the creditors' committee of a chapter 11 debtor to enjoin a stock175
176

Id. at 459.
Id. at 461.
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holders' meeting in In re Allegheny International,Inc. 177 In that case,
the debtor had defaulted on enough dividends on its preferred stock
to trigger the right of the holders of such stock to elect directors. As
a result, the preferred stockholders mounted a proxy fight. The
court stated that the effect of the proxy battle on the 120 day period
of exclusivity, the fact that the proxy battle may have been waged by
a self-serving election committee, and the costs of the proxy battle
did not constitute clear abuse. After discounting the impact of these
threats to the reorganization process, the court stated that although
the interests of the debtor's unsecured creditors would be better served by prompt submission of a reorganization plan....
the ability of shareholders to exercise their rights to corporate
governance cannot be enjoined simply on the basis that a
group of shareholders may be successful in their bid to elect
directors whose views concerning a plan of reorganization may
differ from those of existing management. The possibility of
harm to the interests of the unsecured creditors posed by
these contingent events is simply too remote to support the
finding of irreparable harm necessary for injunctive relief.'7 8
The preferred stockholders eventually elected five out of eleven
79
directors. 1
2.

Preferred Stockholders and the Automatic Stay

As discussed, supra, preferred stockholders have the right to
elect directors upon a default in the payment of dividends. 8 °
Under generally accepted accounting principles, preferred stock
may be accounted for as debt in certain circumstances.' 8 ' As a
result, preferred stockholders who wish to exercise their right to
elect directors may be in violation of the automatic stay by attempting to recover on a claim against the debtor.
The automatic stay, which is codified in § 362 of the Bankruptcy Code,' 8 2 is considered to be one of the most fundamental
177 [1987-1989 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L. Rep. (CCH)
Pa. May 31, 1988).
178

72,328, at 93,150 (W.D.

Id. at 93,154.

179 See ChaimJ. Fortgang & Thomas M. Mayer, Trading Claims and Taking Controlof
Corporations in Chapter 11, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 64 (1990) ("Preferred sharehold-

ers of Allegheny International Inc. mounted a proxy fight, defeated an attempt by
creditors of that chapter 11 debtor to enjoin a shareholders' meeting, and then
elected five out of eleven directors.").
180 See supra notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
181 See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 179, at 72 ("under certain circumstances
preferred stock is accounted for as debt under generally accepted accounting
principles").
182 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
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protections afforded by the bankruptcy laws.'8 " It provides that
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy automatically stays certain
actions directed against the debtor or against the debtor's property.' 8 4 Specifically, § 362(a) provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of, inter alia,
the commencement or continuation ...of a judicial, adminis-

trative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that
was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against
the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title.' 8 5
The automatic stay is intended to provide a debtor with a "breath183 See Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S.
494, 503 (1985) ("The automatic stay ...has been described as 'one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws.' ") (quoting S. REP.
No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 340 (1977)).
184 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
185 Id. § 362(a)(1). Section 362(a) provides in full:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition
filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed
under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970
(15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of

(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance
or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been
commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or
to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of
the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the
case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the
estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before
the commencement of the case under this title against any claim
against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before
the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
Id. § 362(a).
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ing spell" from his creditors and to centralize all disputes concerning property of the estate in the bankruptcy court so that the
reorganization can proceed efficiently.'" 6 Moreover, the automatic
stay operates to preserve property of the debtor's estate for the ben8 7
efit of all creditors.1
Recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit expanded the applicability of the automatic stay in FDIC v.
Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty).'
In that case, involuntary bankruptcy
petitions were filed against Colonial Realty Company and its general
partners, Googel and Sisti. The FDIC, as the receiver of five failed
Connecticut banks, brought an action in a Florida district court to
avoid the transfer of, and recover, assets that Sisti allegedly had
fraudulently conveyed to his wife and other transferees (the "Florida Action"). The Florida Action was brought only against the
transferees to recover the funds for the benefit of the estates of the
failed banks. The FDIC alleged that Sisti made various fraudulent
transfers to the defendants with the intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the FDIC or the five banks. The trustee for the debtors moved
for an order determining that the Florida Action violated § 362 of
the Bankruptcy Code and enjoining the FDIC from continuing the
action.
The Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower courts
that the Florida Action was subject to the automatic stay. The court
analyzed § 362 as staying actions "against the debtor" or "to recover
a claim against the debtor." The court reasoned that the latter category "must encompass cases in which the debtor is not a defendant;
it would otherwise be totally duplicative of the former category and
pure surplusage."i s ' While the Florida Action was not asserted
against any of the debtors, the court held that it should be regarded
as an action to recover a claim against the debtor and thus was subject to the automatic stay:
While a fraudulent transfer action may be an action against a
third party, it is also an action "to recover a claim against the
debtor." Absent a claim against the debtor, there is no independent basis for the action against the transferee. Moreover, the creditor can only recover property or value thereof
186 See, e.g., Shugrue v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.),
922 F.2d 984, 989 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 50 (1991).
187 Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. PSS S.S. Co. (In re Prudential Lines
Inc.), 928 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir. 1991); Hohkamp v. Littlefield (In re Holtkamp),
669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir. 1982).
188 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992).
189 Id. at 131.
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received from the debtor sufficient to satisfy the creditor's

claim against the debtor.' 9 0
The court went on to state that the FDIC's complaint alleged that
Sisti is liable to the FDIC as a result of loans made by the failed
banks and that the defendants are liable as fraudulent transferees of
Sisti. 19 1 Accordingly, the FDIC was seeking to recover a claim
against Sisti and thus was subject to the automatic stay.92
In light of this construction of the scope of the automatic stay, it
appears that an attempt by preferred stockholders to exercise their
right to elect directors may be considered a violation of the automatic stay as an attempt to recover a claim against the debtor. The
recent bench ruling in the chapter 11 case of Fairmont Communications Corporation ("Fairmont"), which was set forth in the record of
the hearing, sheds light on this important issue. 193 In that case,
Price Communications Corporation ("Price"), an unsecured creditor and stockholder, sought an order permitting it to exercise certain irrevocable proxies and appoint an additional director to the
board of directors of Fairmont that would have given it control of
the board. Fairmont had acquired several companies from Price in a
leveraged buy out transaction (the "LBO"), which was funded in
part by Price. As a result of this financing, Fairmont was indebted to
Price in the amount of $94,800,000, which was evidenced by Series
A, B, and C 12.5% subordinated extendible notes with extendible
maturing dates from September 30, 1992 to September 30, 1994
(the "Price Notes"). This unsecured indebtedness was junior and
subordinate to all of Fairmont's other indebtedness.
In connection with the LBO, Fairmont and its four stockhold190 Id. at 132 (quoting In re Saunders, 101 B.R. 303, 305-06 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.

1989)).
191 Id.
192 Cf

Landmark Land Co. v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re Landmark Land Co.),
973 F.2d 283 (4th Cir. 1992). In In re Landmark Land, the court held that the district
court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the RTC, acting as conservator, and thus stock-

holder, of a failed thrift, from assuming control of the thrift's chapter 11 subsidiaries by initiating a stockholders' meeting. The court determined that FIRREA
trumped the Bankruptcy Code by reason of its anti-injunction provisions: "The
comprehensive scheme of FIRREA indicates Congress' intent to allow the RTC full
rein to exercise its statutory authority without injunctive restraints imposed by
bankruptcy courts or district courts in other proceedings." Id. at 290. Thus, the
Fourth Circuit recognized the right of the RTC to exercise its broad powers to
reorganize and collect assets by initiating or convening a stockholders' meeting in
order to elect directors who would withdraw the thrift from bankruptcy. Accord
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. MCorp Fin., Inc., 112 S. Ct. 459
(1991).
193 In re Fairmont Communications Corp., No. 92 B 44861 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar.
3, 1993), appeal docketed, No. 93 Civ. 2388 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 1993).

1512

SETON HALL LI W REVIEW

[Vol. 23:1467

ers, including Price, entered into a stockholders' agreement which
provided that Fairmont would have a five member board of directors. In addition, the other three stockholders were required to deliver irrevocable proxies to Price, entitling Price to elect up to four
additional directors to the board. Price's right to appoint two additional directors could only be exercised after September 30, 1992 if
the Price Notes remained unpaid, accrued interest had been unpaid,
its preferred stock had not been redeemed, or dividends on the preferred stock were in arrears. If the Price Notes remained unpaid on
September 30, 1994, Price had the right to appoint two additional
directors, bringing the board up to nine directors.
The court held that the automatic stay barred Price from exercising its rights under the proxies. By attempting to exercise these
rights, Price was acting as a creditor because the actions it intended
to take were based upon the failure to meet the monetary terms of
the Price Notes and calculated to ensure the payment of such notes.
The court relied on In re Briggs, 19 4 which held that an action taken by
a creditor in the process of seeking voluntary repayment of a prepetition indebtedness violated § 362(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code if
such action "(1) could reasonably be expected to have a significant
impact on the debtor's determination as to whether to repay, and
(2) is contrary to what a reasonable person would consider to be fair
9 5
under the circumstances."1

The court also found that § 362(a)(3) barred Price's actions as
an attempt to exercise control over property of the estate. By electing a director of Price's choosing, Price, in its capacity as a creditor,
would control the board of directors and thus the operations of
Fairmont.
A similar result was reached in In re Bicoastal Corp. ,196 which involved a leveraged buy out of The Singer Company by the debtor.
After obtaining financing for the leveraged buy out from Mesa, the
debtor provided Mesa with a junior note and redeemable preferred
stock in consideration for such financing. The preferred stock provided Mesa with voting rights to appoint the majority of the board
of directors in the event the junior note and preferred stock were
not paid on a timely basis and the preferred stock was not
redeemed.
After the debtor failed to make the requisite payments, Mesa
attempted to exercise its right to designate a majority of the
194 143 B.R. 438 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992).

Id. at 453.
196 No. 89-8189, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 2046 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 1989).
195
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debtor's board of directors. The court held that the automatic stay
barred the actions contemplated by Mesa because Mesa was attempting to indirectly force the repayment of the loan in violation of
§ 362(a)(1). Furthermore, if Mesa were permitted to control the
board of directors, it would obtain, possess, and exercise full control
over the operation of the debtor in violation of § 362(a)(3).
It has also been suggested that attempts by preferred stockholders to exercise their right to elect directors might violate the
automatic stay as an act to collect a debt. For example, Fortgang
and Mayer illustrated this proposition as follows:
[Consider] a bank which has extended credit secured by a
pledge of a controlling stock interest in the debtor. The
pledge agreement gives the bank the right to vote the stock
after an event of default. Surely no court would allow the
bank to enforce such a right and displace the chapter 11
debtor's board. Such an act would clearly violate the automatic stay. Yet it is difficult to see how preferred shareholders, in attempting to elect directors as provided in their
contract, have any greater right to control the debtor than
does the bank with a pledge of stock.' 9 7
The motives of preferred stockholders in demanding a meeting
to elect directors are significantly different from the motives of common stockholders. Common stockholders seek to elect directors as
part of their fundamental right to be heard on corporate governance
matters. They are concerned with electing competent directors who
will benefit the corporation as a whole. In contrast, preferred stockholders have a far narrower interest. Their sole concern is to elect
directors whose first allegiance may be to pursue the parochial interests of preferred stockholders that the dividends that were in arrears
are paid. By indirectly seeking to collect on the claims for forcing
the payment of dividends, preferred stockholders may be in violation of the automatic stay. In addition, by attempting to enforce the
right to elect directors, preferred stockholders, in effect, are attempting to exercise control over the property of the estate based
upon a monetary default. Such action necessarily violates the provisions of the automatic stay.
CONCLUSION

The "institutional integrity of a corporation depends upon
the proper discharge" of a director's fiduciary duties. 98 How197 Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 179, at 72.
198 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814,

824 (N.J. 1981).
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ever, because a chapter 11 debtor represents the entire bankruptcy estate, it has fiduciary obligations to all of the constituents
despite their relative conflicting interests. In fulfilling its fiduciary role, the debtor must resolve these conflicts in accordance
with its duties and powers under the Bankruptcy Code and its
fiduciary responsibilities under applicable nonbankruptcy law to
the creditors and stockholders.
This conflict is exacerbated when the debtor corporation is
insolvent. Although an argument may be made that a chapter 11
debtor has no fiduciary obligations to stockholders of an insolvent corporation because such stockholders have no pecuniary
interest in the debtor, upon closer analysis it becomes evident
that a debtor has a responsibility to continue to negotiate plan
treatment on behalf of such stockholders subject to the overall
constraints imposed by the Bankruptcy Code. The notion that a
debtor and its directors cease to have any obligations to stockholders of an insolvent debtor is contrary to the philosophy, policies, and provisions of chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
Chapter 11 is predicated upon the policy of rehabilitation and
reorganization, with consequent enhancement of the value of the
debtor. Achievement of this objective may provide for participation in the reorganized entity by stockholders despite clear insolvency at the beginning of a chapter 11 case or pursuant to the
consent of creditors as contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code.
For example, by relaxing the absolute priority rule to allow senior classes of creditors to relinquish value to junior classes, the
Bankruptcy Code indicates the congressional intent to encourage
consensual reorganizations with participation by all parties in interest, including old stockholders, notwithstanding the insolvency of the debtor. Thus, it is not inappropriate for the debtor
to reasonably negotiate for old stockholders of an insolvent corporation to share in the reorganization value.
The philosophy of rehabilitation and reorganization under
the Bankruptcy Code enables stockholders to retain an interest in
the administration of the debtor until a confirmed plan of reorganization terminates their interests. It follows, then, that stockholders should continue to retain their fundamental and
paramount right to be heard on corporate governance matters
notwithstanding insolvency so long as those corporate rights do
not conflict with the provisions and purposes of the Bankruptcy
Code.
Although it is sometimes difficult to determine exactly when
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the point of conflict is reached, each case must be determined
based upon its facts and the principles enunciated by the appellate courts. The interests of stockholders should not prolong a
chapter 11 case when it is patent that there is not, and there will
never be, sufficient value to provide any consideration for the
stockholders. However, so long as a debtor has a good faith belief that the corporation can be rehabilitated and that going concern value will be preserved and enhanced, the debtor and its
directors have a duty to attempt to achieve a consensual plan of
reorganization incorporating plan treatment for stockholder interests and junior creditor claims as contemplated by the Bankruptcy Code.
Finally, although the right of common stockholders to elect
directors subsists during reorganization, the right of preferred
stockholders to elect directors upon a default in the payment of
dividends may be in violation of the automatic stay. While common stockholders seek to elect directors as part of their fundamental right to be heard on corporate governance matters,
preferred stockholders seek to elect directors in order to cause
the corporate governors to pursue actions to cure the monetary
dividend defaults and arrearages. In so doing, preferred stockholders may be acting in violation of the automatic stay by seeking to exercise control over the property of the debtor in order to
achieve a recovery on their claims.

